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During the last decade there have been marked changes in the composition of the non-native 
workforce in the German labour market. In particular there has been a notable increase in the 
diversity of nationalities of which the foreign workforce is composed. In this paper we 
investigate the effects of this diversity for native employees. Our analysis is conducted at the 
local level and uses a panel of 326 Western German regions over the time period 1995-2006. 
When considering high-skilled foreign workers, we find that both the size of this group and 
the diversification into different nationalities raise local wages and employment for native 
employees. For low-skilled foreign workers we find negative size effects. However, these 
negative effects can be partly offset if the group of low-skilled foreigners is culturally 
diversified. Our results imply that diversity raises productivity at the local level, but that it is 
important to distinguish the skill composition of the foreign workforce. These findings remain 
robust in a variety of robustness checks that take into account omitted variable bias, self-
selection of foreigners into particular regions, and spatial autocorrelation. 
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1.) Introduction 
Germany has one of the largest shares of workers with foreign nationality across all European 
countries. This share has substantially increased during the early 1990s, mainly due to the fall 
of the iron curtain and the massive immigration from Eastern Europe. It reached a peak in the 
years right after the German reunification, but since 1995 the share of foreign workers in total 
(Western) German employment is roughly stable or even slightly decreasing. Figure 1a shows 
that about 8% of all full-time employment relationships subject to social security (the so-
called “regular employment relationships”) are filled with workers with foreign nationality in 
the year 2006. However, even though the size of the foreign workforce in the German labour 
market has remained roughly stable over the time period 1995-2006, there have been marked 
changes in the composition of this group. Firstly, a relatively well-known trend is that the 
group of foreign workers has, on average, become more educated over time. Particularly since 
1998 there has been an increase in the share of foreign workers with completed tertiary 
education, and a decline of non-university trained foreigners, as is shown in figure 1a.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Another compositional change, which is by far not as widely acknowledged in the general 
public, is that the diversity of the nationalities of which the foreign workforce is composed 
has risen considerably. Figure 1b depicts a Herfindahl-type diversity index over 180 different 
foreign nationalities in the total population of foreign workers with a regular employment 
relationship.
1 This figure suggests that the German labour market has become more 
heterogeneous in terms of national and, thus, linguistic and cultural backgrounds. 
This paper is concerned with the effects of this cultural diversity (measured by the diversity of 
nationalities) on the labour market outcomes for native German workers. We use a panel of 
326 Western German NUTS3 regions (Landkreise) over the time period 1995-2006 and 
analyze the wage and employment effects for natives that are associated with the size and the 
diversification of the foreign workforce at this local level. The main questions that we address 
are the following: Are German workers more successful in regions with a high share of 
foreign workers? In particular, for given local shares of foreigners, are there positive or 
negative effects for the natives when the foreign workforce is heterogeneous in terms of 
national backgrounds? Through which economic channels do the potential effects of cultural 
diversity affect the natives? And finally, are there systematic differences in the effects of 
cultural diversity when distinguishing the foreign workers according to their skill level?  
                                                 
1 See sections 2.3. and 3 for a description of the data and a formal definition of the index.    3
In the recent literature there has been a huge interest in the effects of cultural or ethnic 
diversity on economic performance and various other economic and political outcome 
variables (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, for a survey). This research spans insights from 
various fields and has been conducted at different levels. Macroeconomists and growth 
theorists have, for example, investigated if diversified countries grow faster or slower than 
homogeneous ones (see, e.g., Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009; Easterly and Levine 1997). 
Recent work in behavioural, public and development economics has sought to answer the 
question if teams or village communities perform better (or exhibit more cooperative 
behaviour, or better political outcomes) with a higher degree of heterogeneity of the group 
members. Finally, there is also a small number of papers that address the effects of cultural 
diversity at the regional level, i.e., across cities or counties within the same country (see 
Glaeser et al., 1995; Alesina et al. 1999, 2000; Florida 2002; Ottaviano and Peri 2005, 2006). 
Our study is most closely related to this string of literature.
2 
Why should the diversity of the foreign workforce affect native employees at the level of 
small, local labour markets? In this paper we argue that the impact of diversity may be 
transmitted through different channels via externalities.  Firstly, workers from different 
cultural backgrounds may embody complementary skills and problem-solving abilities. When 
these workers interact, productivity may rise due to knowledge spillovers or other forms of 
production externalities which are known to be strongly localized (Audretsch and Feldmann, 
1996). On the other hand, when the fractionalization becomes too strong, this may also imply 
excessive transaction costs for communication and thus lower local productivity. Secondly, 
the effects of diversity may also operate through a totally different channel, namely by 
affecting the quality of life at the local level. A tolerant native population may value a 
multicultural atmosphere as an attractive feature. Yet, diversity may also be perceived as 
unattractive if natives fear that social conflicts between different foreign nationalities are 
imported into their own neighbourhood (Dustmann and Preston 2001). That is, cultural 
diversity may affect locations, and the natives working therein, both via the production 
(labour demand) and the consumption (labour supply) side, and the net effect could be either 
                                                 
2 Our paper is also more broadly related to the literature on the labour market effects of immigration. For the 
immigration wave to Germany prior to reunification, De New and Zimmermann (1994) find some displacement 
and adverse wage effects for native workers, whereas Pischke and Velling (1997) and Bonin (2005) find little 
evidence for such negative impacts. Glitz (2007) focuses on ethnic German immigration after reunification and 
finds some displacement but no wage effects. D`Amuri et al. (2009) differentiate foreigners and natives by skill 
and experience level. They argue that displacement effects arise, if at all, only for previous migrants but not for 
native workers. Brücker and Jahn (2009) study the wage effects of migration. None of these papers is concerned 
with the effects of the cultural heterogeneity of the group of foreigners, however. An overview of the issues of 
German immigration is provided by Zimmermann et al. (2007). Dustmann and Glitz (2005) and Friedberg and 
Hunt (1995) survey the general literature on the labour market impacts of immigration. Further important 
contributions to that literature include Borjas (1994) and Card (2001).   4
positive or negative. To address these various possibilities we use an estimation framework 
that is based on the spatial equilibrium model by Roback (1982). Within this framework we 
recover the direction of the net impact of cultural diversity, and the channel through which it 
affects natives from regional wage and employment regressions.  
Our paper adds value to the literature on the effects of cultural diversity at the local level in at 
least three important respects. First of all, almost the entire literature has looked at US cities 
and metropolitan areas. For example, in two influential studies, Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 
2006) find that fractionalization of local populations into groups with different primary 
languages spoken at home is robustly positively related with average wages, land rents and 
employment density across US metropolitan areas. This suggests that cultural diversity (here 
measured by a diversity index of primary languages) raises local productivity in the US. It is 
not clear, however, if these results are representative for other countries. One has to keep in 
mind that the United States are the classical immigration country. The major US cities always 
have been “melting pots” and the most favourite destinations for migrants from all over the 
world. For many European countries, including Germany, immigration laws were largely 
based on different priorities, and migration inflows have been considerably smaller 
(Zimmermann 2005). Moreover, labour market institutions in Germany and the US exhibit 
non-negligible differences.
3 It is therefore an open issue if positive local effects of cultural 
diversity, as found for the US case, also arise in a continental European context.  
The second and most important contribution of this paper is to provide an analysis that pays 
close attention to the skill composition of the foreign workforce. The previous literature has 
mainly studied the labour market effects for native employees that are associated with the 
cultural diversification across all foreign workers. We separately study the effects for the 
natives that are associated with the size and the diversification of the groups of high-skilled 
and low-skilled foreign workers, respectively.
4 Such a more disaggregated approach seems 
quite natural. If there is a consumption value of diversity for the natives, this value may be 
quite different depending on whether diversity refers to the group of high-skilled or low-
skilled foreigners. Similarly, when there are inter-cultural learning and knowledge spillovers, 
which possibly make locations more productive, it may require a certain education level on 
the part of the foreigners in order for these production externalities to materialize. 
                                                 
3 Schmidt et al. (1994) show that the effects of immigration into labour markets with high unionisation rates are 
quite different from the effects of immigration into “flexible” labour markets. 
4 In their main theoretical and empirical analysis, Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006) implicitly treat all non-
English speaking workers as equally skilled. In a robustness check, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) control for the 
average education of the foreign population, but they do not systematically distinguish the effects of the diversity 
of skilled versus low-skilled foreign workers.   5
Finally, our third contribution is methodological. In our empirical analysis we address a 
number of estimation concerns and provide a variety of robustness checks. One major 
potential problem is spatial autocorrelation. The administrative regions that form the units of 
observation in our study are unlikely to be independent, but spatially correlated amongst each 
other. As is well known since Anselin (1988), spatial autocorrelation can lead to biased and 
inefficient estimates.  To address this issue we make use of recent progress from the spatial 
econometrics literature and present one of the first applications to panel estimation with 
regional fixed effects. Secondly, we use instrumental variable techniques in order to address 
the causal effect of diversity for the labour market outcomes of natives. Clearly, foreign 
workers may self-select into particular regions, and the local diversity level may be driven by 
local productivity rather than the other way around. Furthermore, cultural diversity may be 
measured with error when using standard fractionalization indices. To address these issues, 
we treat cultural diversity as an endogenous variable and use various instruments in order to 
correct for the bias that would plague OLS estimations.  
Let us briefly preview our main results. For the group of high-skilled foreign workers we find 
that both group size (share in total high-skilled employment) and diversity raise local 
productivity. As for the size of the group of low-skilled foreigners, we find negative wage and 
employment effects. Yet, there are still positive productivity effects for given group sizes if 
the low-skilled foreigners are diversified into many different nationalities.  
More generally, our results suggest that positive labour market effects of cultural diversity do 
in fact exist in Germany, and that they affect natives mainly through the production (labour 
demand) side of the market. Importantly, however, one has to distinguish foreign workers 
with different skill levels to get the overall picture. Diversity seems to be unconditionally 
beneficial for the case of high-skilled foreign workers. Ceteris paribus, the more high-skilled 
foreigners work in a region, the higher is local productivity, especially if this group consists of 
people from various nationalities. With respect to low-skilled foreign workers, diversity per se 
is also beneficial for productivity. To quantify the overall impact of low-skilled foreigners on 
natives, however, one has to take the negative size effects into account as well. The most 
adverse labour market effects for the natives are to be expected in regions that host a large and 
culturally homogeneous group of low-skilled foreign workers. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss some theoretical 
background and present an organizing framework that guides the estimations. Section 3 
describes the data. Our main results are introduced in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes and draws some policy implications.   6
2.) Theoretical background and estimation framework 
2.1. Theory 
Our approach to identify the regional effects of cultural diversity is based on the seminal 
spatial equilibrium concept by Roback (1982). Consider a country that consists of r =1,2,…,N  
locations. There are two goods, a freely tradable commodity Y which is produced under 
constant returns to scale, and a non-tradable stock of land R which is in fixed supply in every 
region and owned by absentee landlords. Firms in the Y-sector use labour and land in 
production and are perfectly mobile across space. Workers are also perfectly mobile across 
space and consume residential land and the tradable good Y. For simplicity it is assumed that 
consumer preferences are homothetic, so that expenditure patterns are independent of income. 
The total number of workers in this economy is given by  rr LL =∑ . 
All markets are perfectly competitive and always clear in equilibrium. The tradable good Y is 
used as the numéraire and its price is normalized to one. The price of land in region r is 
denoted by pr, which follows implicitly from equating the (fixed) supply of land and the 
demand for land which is driven by local population sizes. A crucial assumption is that the 
locations offer different productive and consumptive amenities, respectively affecting the 
location decisions of firms and workers. The utility level of a worker in region r is denoted by 
r U . With homothetic preferences utility can be specified such that it depends on the nominal 
equilibrium wage ( r w ), on the supply of land ( r R ), on the number of workers located in that 
region ( r L ), and on the local consumptive amenity of region r (
C
r A ), i.e.,  () ,,,
C
rr r rr UwLRA . 
Similarly, with constant returns in production, the profit level of a firm in region r can be 
written as  () ,,,
P
rr r r r r wLRA ππ = , where 
P
r A  denotes the level of the productive amenity of 
location r.
5 We can then define a spatial equilibrium as follows: 
 
 
Definition 1: Spatial equilibrium 
A spatial equilibrium is a sequence of prices { } 1,..., N ww , { } 1,..., N p p  and an allocation of 
workers { } 1,..., N L L , such that, given the local supplies of land { } 1,..., N R R  and the values of 
the amenities { } 1 ,...,
CC
N AA  and { } 1 ,...,
P P
N AA : 
                                                 
5 Alternatively we could explicitly solve for the equilibrium price of land pr and specify utility and profit levels 
as functions of wages wr, land prices pr and amenities. We prefer our identification approach that uses wage and 
employment regressions, because the available German data for housing and land prices are far less reliable than 
our very accurate official employment data.   7
1.)  Utility levels are equalized across space   ( ) ( ) [ ] , 1,..., k UUU k l N ⋅= ⋅= ∀ ∈ A  
2.) Profit  levels  are  equalized across space  ( ) ( ) [ ] , 1,..., k kl N πππ ⋅= ⋅= ∀ ∈ A  
3.)  All markets clear. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the concept of spatial equilibrium. Think of one particular city r =1. We 
can invert the profit function  ( ) 11 1 1 1 ,,,
P wLRA ππ =  and derive a labour demand schedule L
D 
that is downward sloping in the (w,L)-space with parameters π ,  { } 1,..., N R R  and 
{ } 1 ,...,
P P
N AA . This function shows the combinations of local wages and employment such that 
the firms in this location are just indifferent between staying and moving to a different region, 
given the exogenous stocks of land and the amenity levels of all regions in this economy. 
Similarly, the utility function  ( ) 11 1 1 1 ,,,
C UUw L R A =  can be inverted to yield an upward 
sloping labour supply schedule L
S with parameters U , { } 1,..., N R R  and { } 1 ,...,
CC
N AA .  
The point X in figure 2 is consistent with a spatial equilibrium: wage and employment 
(density) in city 1 is endogenously determined as w1 and at L1, respectively, given the profit 
and utility level that could be obtained in other locations (π  and U ). Now consider an 
increase of the productive amenity of region 1 ( 1
P A ). At any employment level firms in that 
region could pay higher wages without being induced to leave: the L
D-curve shifts outwards. 
To restore spatial equilibrium, both wage and employment in city 1 must go up. This is 
illustrated by the movement from point X to point Y in figure 1. Since land supply is fixed, 
there is also an increase in the equilibrium price of land as more firms and workers move in. 
An increase in the consumptive amenity  1
C A , on the other hand, would cause the L
S schedule 
to shift down: For any level of employment individuals are willing to work at lower wages, 
due to the higher quality of life in that location. The new equilibrium would involve a lower 
wage in city 1, but a higher employment level (and thus, higher land rent). This is illustrated 
by the movement from point X to point Z in figure 2. 
Hence, both types of (positive) amenities increase employment (and thus capitalize in higher 
land prices), but productive amenities imply higher wages whereas consumptive amenities 
imply lower wages. An equivalent thought experiment is the following: Consider point X as 
the level of wages and employment in city 1. Now suppose we observe a second city (r=2) 
that has an identical supply of land but a higher employment density (and thus, higher land   8
rent). Figure 2 suggests that city 2 either has a higher productive, or a higher consumptive 
amenity, or a combination of the two. The first case is associated with higher wages (point Y), 
the second case with lower wages in city 2 (point Z), and for the third case it depends on 
which type of amenity is stronger. Wage and employment regressions can thus be used to 
recover the net effect of productive and consumptive amenities across cities.  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
What precisely determines the productive and consumptive amenities of a location? Various 
candidates such as weather, landscape, local infrastructure, etc., have been considered in the 
literature. In this paper we hypothesize that the cultural diversity of a city can also be regarded 
as such a location characteristic. Given the previously mentioned evidence on the relatively 
small direct displacement effects in the German labour market (Bonin 2005, D’Amuri et al. 
2009), we thus assume that natives and foreigners do not directly compete for the same types 
of jobs in the market, but that the foreign workforce nevertheless affects the labour market 
outcomes for natives via external effects. It is, however, not clear if diversity mainly affects 
the labour demand or the labour supply side, and whether the net impact is positive or 
negative. For each of the cases there exist sensible economic theories, which we now briefly 
discuss in turn. 
 
A) Diversity may be a positive productive amenity: A culturally diversified stock of foreigners 
may raise local productivity, because it enriches the variety of culture-specific skills or 
problem solving abilities, which in turn fosters innovation.  
B) Diversity may be a negative productive amenity: At the same time, diversity may also 
lower productivity because it increases communication costs which naturally arise if people of 
different cultural backgrounds have to interact and to work together on projects. 
 
The trade-off of heterogeneity as a productive (dis-)amenity has, for example, been described 
in a formal model by Berliant and Fujita (2008). In that model knowledge creation or 
innovation requires interaction between individuals. The potential innovators need some non-
overlapping prior knowledge, because people with identical background cannot learn from 
each other. At the same time the individuals also need some overlapping stock of knowledge 
since they otherwise have no common basis for communication. Berliant and Fujita (2008) do 
not explicitly distinguish between foreigners and natives, but the trade-off described in their   9
model also applies to the productivity effects of cultural diversity at the local level: Some 
diversity may raise productivity because it goes hand in hand with sufficiently differentiated 
initial stocks of knowledge. Too much diversity, on the other hand, may lead to lower 
productivity because communication becomes too costly.
6 Positive productivity effects of 
diversity are also often included directly in the production function. Here it is typically 
assumed that different ethnic or cultural groups represent distinct input factors, and that these 
inputs are combined in a production process that exhibits increasing returns to variety (mostly 
a CES function), see e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Ottaviano and Peri (2005). Also, 
gains of productivity are possibly due to a higher degree of innovation mediated by a diverse 
workforce (see Niebuhr, forthcoming). These potential productivity enhancing effects can 
then be countervailed by transaction costs of communication. The latter point is made explicit 
in Lazear (1999) who discusses the diversity of languages in a multicultural society. In his 
model individuals can only engage in economic transactions if they speak the same language. 
That is, linguistic and cultural fragmentation lowers productivity because people cannot 
communicate and trade.  
Turning to the second possible channel, diversity may also be a location characteristic that 
mainly affects private location decisions of individuals: 
 
C) Diversity may be a positive consumptive amenity: A diversified multicultural environment 
may be perceived as an attractive regional attribute by a tolerant native population.  
D) Diversity may be a negative consumptive amenity: Diversity may, however, also be 
perceived as an unattractive location characteristic, because the natives fear foreign 
infiltration that gives rise to social conflict between too many different nationalities, etc.   
 
Suppose that the single cultural groups also produce differentiated ethnic goods, and that 
natives have a CES-type utility function that exhibits love for variety. Suppose for simplicity 
that these ethnic goods are non-tradable. It is then easy to see that diversity in a region raises 
utility, because of a higher variety of cultural goods in a diverse region. At the same time 
there is abundant work in development and public economics showing that individuals often 
distrust members of other ethnic groups and tend to prefer interacting in culturally relatively 
homogeneous communities (see Glaseser et. al. 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). These 
                                                 
6 A similar question is analyzed in Hong and Page (2001) who consider individual and collective problem 
solving of heterogeneous individuals.    10
two forces thus operate into different directions, so that it is unclear if people associate a 
positive or negative overall consumption value with the cultural diversity of a location. 
The rationale for distinguishing between the diversity of high-skilled and low-skilled foreign 
workers, which is one of the main contributions of this paper, relates directly to this 
theoretical framework. It is well conceivable that skilled and low-skilled foreign workers 
affect regional productive and consumptive amenities very differently. A positive impact of 
diversity on productivity may require a certain skill level of the foreign workers. Similarly, 
the consumption value of a multicultural environment may also depend on how educated the 
group of foreigners is. We therefore distinguish explicitly the diversity of the group of high-
skilled foreign workers in a region, and the diversity of the low-skilled foreigners. 
 
2.2. Estimation framework 
The theoretical framework outlined above suggests that wage and employment regressions for 
native German workers are well suited to disentangle the net effect of cultural diversity at the 
local level. We use the following specification for the empirical model: 
 
  ()
wage wage wage wage wage
rt r t rt rt rt wage div X α αβ γ ε =++⋅+ ⋅ + ,, , , ln  (1) 
  ()
emp emp emp emp emp
rt r t rt rt rt emp div X α αβ γ ε =++⋅+ ⋅ + ,, , , ln  (2) 
 
rt emp  is employment and  rt w  is the average wage for native workers in city r and time t.  rt div  
measures cultural diversity and refers to the foreign workers in region r. The precise 
specification of  rt div  for the empirical analysis is discussed below.  rt X  are additional control 
variables (such as the firm size, industry and skill composition of the native population), the 
α ’s are time and region fixed effects, and the ε ’s are error terms.
7  
The central coefficients of interest are 
wage β  and 
emp β . If diversity is a positive production 
amenity we should find positive wages and employment effects ( 0
wage β > , 0
emp β > ). A 
negative production amenity would imply negative signs of both coefficients. If diversity is a 
positive consumption amenity we should find positive employment and negative wage effects 
(0
wage β < , 0
emp β > ). If it is a negative consumption amenity, there must be a compensating 
wage differential ( 0
wage β > ) and negative employment effects ( 0
emp β < ). 
                                                 
7 Notice that we could have specified employment density (empr,t /area size) as the dependent variable in (2), 
which is equivalent since time-invariant area sizes are captured by the regional fixed effects. The theoretical 
framework also suggests that we must always control for regional supply of housing, as the model assumes a 
fixed supply of land. In the regressions below we always control for Rr.    11
 
 
2.3. Measurement of diversity 
In the estimations we include two variables related to the foreign labour market participation. 
Firstly, we control for the share of foreign workers in total area employment, i.e.  
  ,, , rt rt rt s foreigners emp =  (3) 
This variable measures the size of the group of foreign individuals who work in region r at 
time t. The second variable then specifically measures the degree of diversification of the 
stock of foreigners into different nationalities. We use a diversity index that is based on the 

















∑ , (4) 
where group  1,2,..., kK =  indexes the different foreign nationalities. This index takes on 
values between 0 and 1 and stands for the probability that two randomly drawn foreign 
employees belong to two different nationalities. If all foreigners in region r  have the same 
nationality we would have  , 0 rt hhi = , and the index then increases in the degree of diversity.
8  
The correlation between  , rt s  and  , rt hhi  in the data turns out to be rather modes ( 0.2 ρ ≈ ), 
which allows us to control for both variables at the same time and, thus, to separate 
fractionalization and size effects of the foreign workforce. More formally, in the equations (1) 
and (2) we typically use the specification 
wage
rt div β ⋅ = ,   12
wage wage
rt rt s hhi ββ ⋅+ ⋅ ,,  and 
wage
rt div β ⋅= ,   12
emp emp
rt rt s hhi ββ ⋅+ ⋅ ,, . When we explicitly distinguish the group of foreign 
workers in region r by their skill level, we replace  , rt s  by the share of high-skilled (low-
skilled) foreign workers in total regional high-skilled (low-skilled) employment. Furthermore, 
we then separately measure the diversity index  , rt hhi  for the sub-population of high-skilled 
(low-skilled) foreign workers in region r. 
 
3.) Data and descriptive overview 
3.1. Data issues 
The data basis for this study is provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). It 
includes the complete population of full-time employment relationships subject to social 
                                                 
8 For robustness checks we have also considered an entropy index as an alternative diversity measure. The 
estimation results for the entropy index turn out to be very similar as for the Herfindahl-index.    12
security (i.e. excluding civil servants and self-employed individuals), aggregated at the level 
of the 326 Western German NUTS3-districts (“Landkreise” and “kreisfreie Städte”).  
Several remarks are in order about this data set. First of all, it contains information drawn 
from the official German employment statistics by the Federal Employment Agency which is 
used in the administration of the social security system. The data is therefore highly reliable 
as unit non-response and measurement error are reduced to a minimum. It is available as a 
balanced panel on an annual basis (1995-2006). For every region and every year we also have 
detailed additional information about structural characteristics of the local native workforces, 
such as industrial composition, qualification, firm size, age and gender structure of regional 
employment. This information will be used to construct further control variables which we 
include in order to avoid omitted variable bias for our central coefficients of interest.  
Still there are a few limitations that we have to face. Firstly, we measure regular employment 
at the regional level. I.e., foreigners as well as natives enter our data set only if they work full 
time and pay social security contributions. On the one hand this seems to be appropriate as we 
are interested in the labour market effects of cultural diversity. Yet, some of the above 
mentioned theoretical mechanisms may actually depend on the size and composition of the 
local foreign population, rather than on the sub-population of foreigners who work full time. 
Since foreign population and employment are strongly correlated, however, we believe that 
the use of our data set does not lead to any systematic errors or biases. 
The second data issue concerns the definition of native and foreign workers, namely that we 
proxy culture with the recorded nationality of an individual. We can measure the latter in a 
very detailed way, as more than 180 different foreign nationalities can be distinguished. 
Nationality is still only an imperfect measure of culture, however. First of all, there is 
naturalization of immigrants who obtain German citizenship subject to certain restrictions, 
even though overall naturalization rates are quite low (see D´Amuri et al., 2009). 
Naturalization, which is particularly relevant for the ethnic German immigrants, implies that 
these individuals are recorded as native workers, even if they are not “culturally assimilated” 
in any meaningful way. Second-generation migrants also often have German nationality 
although they may be culturally closer to their parents’ country of origin. An alternative 
approach would be to measure culture by the primary language spoken at home, or by a 
similar variable. This would mean abandoning the use of official employment data, however, 
which does not include such information. We would have to use survey data instead, which is 
of substantially lower quality in other respects, especially when conducting an analysis at the   13
regional level. Hence we decided to use of official labour market data while hoping that the 
associated data problems of measuring culture are not too severe.
9 
The next data issue concerns the wage information for native workers, which will be used as 
one of our dependent variables. For every region and every year we compute the average 
daily wage income per employee, including all bonuses and extra payments subject to social 
security. The underlying micro-data for individual wage earnings have the problem that 
income levels which exceed the threshold for social security contributions are reported with 
this value. The data therefore understates the true degree of wage dispersion in Western 
Germany. There have been experiments at the IAB to estimate and to impute true wage 
earnings for individuals at the income threshold, but it turns out that this procedure has only 
minor effects on the distribution of regional average wages. Since our study uses average 
regional wages only, we are confident that our data is reasonably accurate also in this respect. 
The final data issue is the classification of regions in our data set. We use administrative 
regions (NUTS3) which are not defined according to economic criteria. This raises the 
concern that some of our results may be artefacts of the choice of these units. Below we 
consider spatial econometric techniques to explicitly take spatial autocorrelation into account.  
 
3.2. Descriptive overview 
Before turning to the estimation results we give a brief descriptive overview about the 
participation of foreign workers in this section. In table 1 we report the ten nationalities with 
the largest employment shares in Western Germany for the years 1995 and 2006, respectively.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
As can be seen, the Turkish employees form the largest foreign group, followed by employees 
from the former Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece. This ranking is very persistent over the years, 
and reflects longer historical incidents that can be traced back to the mid-1950s. The first 
large wave of immigration after WWII was caused by a shortage of labour that characterised 
the post-war economic boom. Various industries obtained the permission to hire foreign 
“guest workers”, in order to fill low-paid positions for which it was difficult to find German 
applicants. Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece have been the countries where most guest 
workers were recruited. Originally the intention has been to issue only temporary work 
permits, and that the guest workers return to their countries after a certain period, but this was 
                                                 
9 See Desmet et al. (2009) for a recent contribution about how “cultural diversity” can be defined in a 
meaningful way, by making use of very long-term linguistic data about language trees.   14
never strictly enforced. Quite the contrary, many former guest workers became assimilated in 
Germany and reunified with their families.  
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Turning to the regional level, the map in figure 3 illustrates the total shares of foreign 
employees in 2006. The largest shares are found in the metropolitan areas in the southern part 
of the country (around Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Munich) and in the Rhine-Ruhr area in the 
West. The share of foreign workers is below 1% in several other, more rural areas in the 
North. In table 2 we report further information for the seven largest cities in Western 
Germany (in terms of total regional employment). Except for Hannover, all large cities have 
above-average total shares of foreign workers. Table 2 also suggests that the foreign 
workforces in large cities tend to be relatively highly skilled compared to the Western 
German average, Hannover again being the exception. Finally table 2 reports the diversity 
index of the foreign workforce in the selected large cities. Notice at first that the high-skilled 
foreign population is more diverse than the foreign population in general. This is due to the 
fact that foreigners of certain nationalities (particularly Western European and North 
American) are likely to be high-skilled if they work in Germany. Furthermore, urban foreign 
workforces tend to be more diverse than rural ones, as the total diversity index tends to range 
above the average for the large cities. This is also true when focussing only on the diversity of 
the skilled foreign workforce.  
 
4.) Results 
4.1. All foreign workers 
Table 3 presents the benchmark results for the wage and employment regression, eqs. (1) and 
(2), where we do not distinguish the skill level of the foreign workforce. In the first column of 
the wage regression we only control for the total share of foreign born workers ( , rt s ), for their 
degree of cultural diversification as measured by the Herfindahl-index ( , rt hhi ), for area and 
time period fixed effects, and for overall regional housing supply  , rt R  as measured by the 
number of housing units. In these specifications we leave out all additional control variables 
that pertain to structural characteristics of the native workforces.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE   15
We find highly significant negative wage effects from the total share of foreign workers. The 
diversity index on the other hand is positively associated with average wages for the natives. 
That is, wages are lower in German regions with a large share of foreign workers, but for a 
given share wages are higher if the foreign workforce is diversified into many nationalities. In 
column 2 we include an index of regional industrial diversity, more precisely a Herfindahl-
index of regional employment shares across 28 different industries, as well as the broad 
regional employment shares of manufacturing and service industries (leaving primary 
industries and the public sector as the excluded reference categories). The reason for 
including local industrial diversity is that cultural diversity might simply capture occupational 
heterogeneity as many industries which are prone to hiring a diverse body of (specialist) 
foreign workers are likely to be concentrated in major cities. By conditioning our estimates on 
the local industrial structure in this way, we decrease the concern of measurement error or 
omitted variable bias. As can be seen, the findings for the central coefficients of interest 
remain robust. Although wages tend to be higher in regions with industrial diversity, there is 
still an independent and significantly positive effect of the cultural diversity of the foreign 
workforce. In column 3 we add several further standard control variables that pertain to the 
qualification, firm size, sex, and age structure of the regional native workforces. The 
estimated coefficients for these characteristics all have the expected sign and are precisely 
estimated. With respect to our main coefficients of interest, we find that the negative wage 
effect for the total share of foreign workers diminishes. This suggests some correlation with 
the regional control variables for native workers. The effect remains highly statistically 
significant, however. Similarly, the diversity index exerts a smaller but still significantly 
positive effect on native wages. 
The specification of the regression model raises the concern that the labour market outcomes 
for natives can be affected by further, unobservable factors that are left out of the regression. 
Notice, however, that we include regional fixed effects so that all time-invariant local 
characteristics are controlled for. Still, there could be time-varying regional shocks that affect 
both native labour market outcomes and foreign diversity levels. This would lead to positive 
but spurious correlation between the two variables. We address this issue by including the net 
immigration rate of working-age native individuals in region r and year t, because unobserved 
regional shocks would affect regional migration patterns, which in turn would be the central   16
economic force to absorb these shocks. As can be seen in column 4 of table 3, however, all 
our main findings remain robust to this control for unobservable regional shocks.  
Notice further that the regional fixed effects 
wage
r α  also reduce the estimation concern of 
reverse causality. That problem can arise, because foreigners may self-select into particular 
locations, presumably into high wage regions. In other words, wages might drive diversity 
rather than the other around.
10 One should keep in mind, however, that identification of our 
regression model rests on the changes in diversity over time. This takes a first cut at the 
endogeneity issue, since changes in diversity are less likely to be endogenous to the 
contemporaneous changes in native wages. To demonstrate this point, we have considered a 
version of specification (4) where we drop the regional fixed effects 
wage
r α  and run a pooled 
cross-sectional (OLS) analysis. For the share of foreign workers we now obtain a positive and 
highly significant coefficient  1 0 9066
wage β = .  (std. error 0.017), which confirms that a standard 
OLS analysis leads to biased estimates. For the diversity index we obtain  2 0 1028
wage β = .  (std. 
error 0.006) in the pooled OLS regression. In section 5 we further address self-selection of 
foreigners into high wage locations by treating  rt div ,  as an endogenous variable and using 
instrumental variable techniques.  
Turning to the results of the employment regression in columns 5 and 6 of table 3, we find a 
negative and highly significant effect arising from the total share of foreign workers on native 
employment ( 1 0
emp β < ). As for the impact of diversification, the effect on native employment 
is positive and statistically significant ( 2 0
emp β > ). Both results are robust regardless of the set 
of additional regional control variables, and regardless of whether we additionally control for 
net immigration rate of natives as our proxy for unobserved regional shocks.  
Our results are only partly consistent with those of Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006), who have 
investigated the labour market effects of cultural diversity across US metropolitan areas. 
These authors consider the effects of diversification across all foreign workers (whose main 
language is not English), without differentiating the foreigners by their skill level. They find 
that overall diversity is positively related with wages and employment/land prices for the 
native (English speaking) individuals. Our findings confirm these results only conditional on 
the size of the regional foreign workforces. Taking the results of table 3 literally, we would 
                                                 
10 Glitz (2007) exploits the fact that some immigrants, namely the ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, have 
been randomly assigned to different locations in Germany. This unique setting allows him to view this 
immigration wave as a quasi-natural experiment. In many other instances the location choice of foreigners within 
Germany is not random, however, which forces us to worry about self-selection of the foreigners.   17
have to conclude that regional productivity is lower the larger is the overall share of foreign 
workers, because we find negative wage and employment effects ( 1 0
wage β <   and  1 0
emp β < ). 
These negative productivity effects are only partly offset if the foreign population is 
sufficiently diversified into many different nationalities. We do not believe that this 
interpretation is sensible, however, precisely because the estimations do not distinguish the 
group of foreigners into high-skilled and low-skilled workers. The results reported in table 3 
are thus likely to capture a net effect that masks more specific impacts of foreign workers 
with different skill levels. We now turn to this issue in a more detailed analysis. 
 
4.2. Foreign workers differentiated by skill level 
In table 4 we report the results for the wage and employment regressions for native workers 
when controlling separately for the share and the diversification of high-skilled and low-
skilled foreign workers, respectively. We use the same set of control variables as in column 3 
of table 3 and exchange  , rt s  with  ,
skilled
rt s  (table 4a) or with  ,
unskilled
rt s  (table 4b). Furthermore, we 
now use the diversity index  , rt hhi  for the sub-populations of high-skilled (low-skilled) 
foreigners separately. For expositional purposes we only report the results for our central 
explanatory variables and omit the other estimated coefficients, since they turn out to be very 
similar as before. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
For the group of high-skilled foreign workers with completed tertiary education we now find 
that both their total share in regional high-skilled employment, and their diversification in 
terms of nationalities are associated with positive wage and employment effects for the native 
workers. All estimated coefficients are highly significant at the 1% level and robust to 
including the regional immigration rate of natives (see specifications 3 and 4). These results 
suggest that a skilled foreign population is a productive amenity for a German region. The 
larger is the share of high-skilled foreign workers, the higher is regional productivity and the 
higher are, thus, average regional wages and employment for the natives. This positive impact 
is reinforced if the population of high-skilled foreigners is heterogeneous in terms of 
nationalities. In other words, everything else equal, we find that regional productivity is 
highest in regions that host a large and heterogeneous group of high-skilled foreign workers.
11 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that our empirical framework identifies the net effects of cultural diversity. A large skilled 
foreign population may also have a consumption value for the native population. If this is so, this consumption 
value capitalizes in lower wages, and the observed positive wage effect even underestimates the true productivity   18
With respect to the group of low-skilled foreign workers results are different. The larger is the 
share of low-skilled foreign employees in a region, the lower is the average wage and the 
lower is employment for the natives. Hence, the size of this group of low-skilled foreign 
workers can be interpreted as a negative production amenity from a regional perspective. Still, 
for a given size of the low-skilled foreign population, we still find positive effects associated 
with the diversification of this group. This means that a region with a large share of low-
skilled foreign workers (call it “region 1”) need not be less productive than an otherwise 
similar region with a smaller share of low-skilled foreigners (“region 2”), provided the foreign 
population in region 1 is sufficiently more heterogeneous than in region 2. The most adverse 
labour market effects for native workers are to be expected in regions with a large and 
culturally homogenous group of low-skilled foreign workers. These results are again robust to 
including further controls, including the regional immigration rate for natives. 
In sum, the main message of this section is that native employees are affected quite differently 
from the presence of high-skilled and low-skilled foreign workers. The size of the former 
group has positive, whereas the size of the latter group has negative productivity effects on 
local labour markets in Western Germany. A study that only looks at the overall group of 
foreign workers is unable to capture this important distinction. For both high-skilled and low-
skilled foreign workers, however, we find positive productivity effects associated with the 
diversity of nationalities. Thus, cultural diversity has positive productivity effects in Western 
Germany – unconditionally in the case of high-skilled foreign workers, and conditional on 
size in the case of low-skilled foreign workers. 
 
5.) Robustness checks 
In the remainder of this paper we address the robustness of these main results. Specifically, in 
section 5.1 we address the issue of spatial autocorrelation, and in section 5.2 we address 
potential endogeneity concerns in greater detail. 
 
5.1 Spatially correlated errors 
We have so far treated the regional units as if they were independent of each other. However, 
as we use administrative regions, it is likely that there exist cross-regional spillovers and thus 
spatial dependence across the single units. To account for this issue we make use of spatial 
econometric techniques. More specifically, we assume a spatial AR(1)-process for the error 
                                                                                                                                                          
effect. Likewise, the diversification of the foreign population may also have an effect on the consumption side. 
The main impact of diversity is operating through the production (labour demand) side of the market, however.   19
term, which is the standard Cliff and Ord type parameterization in this context (Anselin 1988; 




rt pr pt rt p w ε ρε ν




pr pt p w ε
= ∑  is the spatial lag of the error process, ρ  is the spatial autoregressive 
parameter and  rt ν  denotes an i.i.d. error term with zero expectation and variance 
2
ν σ . Stacking 
the error term for period t gives: 
   t t t ν Wε ε + = ρ  (6) 
The matrix W is the spatial row-normalized weighting matrix of dimension  N N ×  and 
collects the weights  pr w . In our case we use a simple contiguity matrix. We define the 
weights as equal to unity if two regions share a common border and zero otherwise. As usual, 
we do not consider any region to be its own neighbour.  
To estimate the unknown parameter ρ we follow Kapoor et al. (2007) by using a GM-
estimator. However, in contrast to their approach we specify a panel model with fixed instead 
of random effects. Therefore, we apply a modified estimator which has been proposed by 
Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2008). This GM-estimator makes use of only the three first moment 
conditions of Kapoor et al. (2007). Starting point for the GM-estimation are the estimated 
residuals from a consistent FE-estimation. With a consistent estimator for ρ  at han d we 
transform the models (1) and (2) by pre-multiplication with  ( ) ( ) W I I ρ ˆ − ⊗ N T . The resulting 
error term is spatially uncorrelated. In the last step we compute the FE-estimator for the 
coefficient vector of the transformed models. Table 5 reports the estimation results. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
In the wage regressions we obtain consistent results. Concerning the size effects of the foreign 
workforce on the average wage of native employees we still see the difference between high-
skilled and low-skilled foreigners: For the former group we obtain positive, for the latter we 
obtain negative wage effects. The diversity index has a positive and highly significant effect, 
both with respect to high-skilled and low-skilled foreign workers. All these results are robust 
to controlling for spatially correlated unobserved regional shocks. Turning to the employment 
regressions, the results of the spatial model are also consistent, except for the fact that the 
coefficient for the diversity index is no longer significant at the 10% level. The sign of the 
coefficients are still positive in all cases, however, which is in line with our previous findings.   20
Overall, we therefore conclude that our main findings are no artefacts of the spatial units of 
observations, as they are robust to explicitly accounting for spatially correlated errors.  
 
5.2. Endogeneity 
As argued above, foreign workers may not causally affect regional productivity and wages, 
but instead endogenously self-select into particular locations. Especially with respect to the 
wage regression our estimations may therefore suffer from a problem of reverse causality, as 
workers may sort into high-wage locations. We have demonstrated above that a simple pooled 
OLS regression is clearly ill-equipped to distinguish between the effect of diversity on wages 
and the opposite effect of wages on migration flows, as it overstates the importance of the 
former channel. Introducing regional fixed effects reduces these concerns, but does not 
necessarily resolve them entirely. Furthermore, the share of foreign workers and the 
fractionalization index may capture the true effects of cultural diversity only imperfectly, so 
that OLS estimates would be biased due to measurement error. To address these concerns we 
turn to an instrumental variable estimation of our panel model in this subsection. 
This approach causes several conceptual difficulties when it comes to selecting suitable 
instrumental variables for cultural diversity. Firstly, to satisfy the exclusion restrictions 
instruments need to be correlated with the geographical distribution of foreign workers, but 
not with current regional wages or productivities. Secondly, the instruments need to vary 
across regions and time. Thirdly, since we have two endogenous variables (the share of 
foreign workers and the diversity index), we need at least two instrumental variables.  
We have considered several possible instrumental variables. Our primary set of instruments 
for the current diversity are time-lagged diversity variables of the same region. Specifically, 
we use second-order time lags of the share of (high-skilled or low-skilled) foreign workers 
and the respective twice lagged Herfindahl diversity indices. According to a standard Sargan-
test these second-order lags (unlike first-order lags) are suitable instruments for the current 
levels of cultural diversity. Furthermore, apart from passing validity tests, one should also 
verify if the chosen instruments have sufficient explanatory power, as weak instruments 
would lead to poor finite-sample properties regarding bias and size of significance tests 
(Bound et al. 1995). As we have to instrument two endogenous variables, a simple F-test of 
the joint significance of the instruments in a first-stage regression can be misleading, but we 
use the Cragg-Donald statistic instead.
12 When considering the second-order time lags of the 
                                                 
12 The Cragg-Donald statistic is the minimum Eigenvalue of the generalized F-statistic from the fist-stage 
regressions. Stock and Yogo (2005) provide pre-determined critical values for this statistic under which the size 
of a nominal 5 percent Wald test on a regression coefficient is actually at least 10 percent.   21
diversity variables, we not only find that the Sargan-test cannot reject the null of exogeneity, 
but also that these instruments appear to be strong.  
As we do not want to rely exclusively on time-lagged control variables as instruments, 
however, we have furthermore considered three other variables, all of which fulfil the 
requirements for exogenous and strong instruments according to the Sargan- and the Cragg-
Donald test. Firstly, we use the fertility of the regional foreign populations, more precisely the 
share of foreign babies in all regional births per year, and the number of foreign babies per 
foreign employee in every region and year. Both fertility-related variables are likely to be 
correlated with the size and characteristics of the foreign workers in a region, but unlikely to 
be correlated with the labour market performance of native workers. Secondly, we use the 
regional vote shares of the Green party in the national elections (Bundestagswahlen).
13 This 
variable may be regarded as a proxy for the tolerance of the native populations towards 
foreigners, but is per se unlikely to exert an effect on the labour market performance of native 
workers. Thirdly, we use historical regional employment shares of classical guest worker 
industries. As described above, the guest worker families represented the first large 
immigration wave to Western Germany after World War II. The guest workers typically 
found employment in industries with low formal skill requirements. We consider mining, 
building& construction, gastronomy and household-related services as typical guest worker 
industries, and we construct time-varying regional employment shares of these industries. Our 
data for this instrument starts with the year 1977, which is in fact the earliest time period for 
which we can obtain reliable regional labour market data and 18 years before the start of our 
observation period. These lagged industrial structures have determined historical location 
patterns of immigrants across Germany, and are thus likely to be correlated with the current 
geographical distribution of families with migration background due to the of persistence of 
migration networks. At the same time these historical local industry compositions are less 
likely to have an effect on current economic performance, because the importance of the 
classical guest worker industries for aggregate economic activity has rapidly diminished over 
time.
14 Table 6a and 6b summarize the results of the wage regression controlling for the share 
and the diversification of high-skilled and low-skilled foreign workers, respectively.
15  
                                                 
13 As national elections take place only every four years, we extrapolate the regional vote shares for the years in 
between elections in order to have a consistent time-variant instrument. 
14 See Findeisen and Südekum (2008) for an analysis of structural change at the regional level in Germany. 
15 In their analysis for the US, Ottaviano and Peri (2005) use two types of instruments: 1) the geographical 
distance of metropolitan areas to major immigration hubs, 2) a “shift-share instrument” that calculates 
hypothetical local diversity indices from employment growth rates for workers from particular foreign 
nationalities in the country as a whole. We have experimented with similar instruments, but these variables did 
not pass our specification tests. In particular, we have considered the regional distance to exterior borders of   22
TABLE 6 HERE 
In the first columns of panels A and B we report the results of the standard fixed effects 
estimation as a benchmark. The other columns refer to estimations where we use the time-
lagged diversity variables and one or more of the above mentioned other variables as 
instruments. As mentioned before, all these specifications pass the standard Sargan test for 
exogenous and the Cragg-Donald test for strong instruments. Again we focus on the main 
coefficients of interest while leaving out the other regional controls for brevity. 
For the high-skilled foreign workers we still find that both their share and their diversification 
have positive effects on the regional average wage for native workers. The share of low-
skilled foreign workers has a negative effect, but there are still positive wage effects 
associated with the diversification of this group. Comparing the standard fixed effects and the 
instrumental variable regressions, we find much larger effects with the latter approach. In 
principle, such a notable difference between the estimated coefficients could be caused by a 
weak instrument problem which leads to a large bias of the IV estimates. However, the Cragg-
Donald test suggests that this is not the case in our analysis. An alternative explanation for the 
difference in the coefficients is that our diversity indices may be noisy measures for the “true” 
impact of cultural diversity on local labour markets. The larger coefficients in the 
instrumental variable regressions (in absolute terms) would then result from a reduction in the 
attenuation bias that results from the measurement error of the variable  , rt div . In that case the 
“true” effect of cultural diversity is actually closer to the coefficient of the instrumental 
variable estimation. 
Summing up, our main results remain qualitatively robust when treating the qualification-
specific shares of foreign workers and the respective diversification indices as endogenous. In 
fact, the instrumental variable estimation gives us reason to believe that the “true” effects of 
cultural diversity were even understated in the benchmark analysis in section 4. 
 
6) Conclusions 
Skilled foreign workers affect native employees on regional labour markets quite differently 
than low-skilled foreign workers. The presence of high-skilled foreign workers can be 
regarded as a positive production amenity from a regional perspective, especially if this group 
is diversified in terms of national and cultural backgrounds. For low-skilled foreign workers 
                                                                                                                                                          
Germany interacted with a time dummy. This instrument has almost no explanatory power, however, which is 
probably due to the relatively small geographical size of Western Germany compared to the US. The shift-share 
instrument did not pass the instrument validity test.   23
results are different. The larger is the size of this group, the lower is regional productivity. 
Yet, conditional on the size of the low-skilled foreign workforce, we still find positive 
productivity effects associated with their diversification. These conclusions turn out to be 
robust to several estimation concerns.  
These finding have important implications for the policy debate about the principles of 
immigration to Germany. This debate has strongly focussed on the skill composition of the 
immigrants. It led to several attempts to target high-skilled foreign immigrants in specific 
industries where native specialists are in short supply (e.g., in the IT business). The cultural 
diversity of the immigrants, i.e., the composition of the overall group of immigrants in terms 
of foreign nationalities, has so far played a minor role in this debate. Our results suggest that 
there are returns to cultural diversity in regional labour markets, and that immigration policy 
can consequently be improved by taking these aspects into account. Moreover our results 
suggest that multiculturalism has rather tangible effects. The impacts do not appear to be 
mainly transmitted through “soft” location factors that shape the perceptions about the quality 
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Figure 1: Foreign worksers in the West German labour market 
 
 
Figure 1a: Share of foreign workers in total 




Figure 1b: Diversity within the group of foreigners 
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Note: Map shows the shares of foreign 
employees in total regional full-time 
employment for the 326 Western German 
NUTS3-regions (“Kreise” and “kreisfreie 
Städte”) for the year 2006.   29
Table 1: Largest foreign nationalities in Western Germany (in %) 
Rank 1995  2006 
1 Turkey  28.24  Turkey  27.13 
2 frm.  Yugoslavia  19.92  frm. Yugoslavia  14.43 
3 Italy  10.06  Italy  10.35 
4 Greece  5.58  Greece  5.00 
5 Austria  3.95  frm. Soviet Union  4.55 
6 France  3.35  Poland  4.19 
7 Poland  3.01  France  4.06 
8 Portugal  2.51  Austria  3.11 
9 Spain  2.41  Portugal  2.38 
10 Netherlands  1.90  Spain  1.91 
Note:   Table 1 shows the ten largest share of nationality k in the total population of foreign full-time 




Table 2: Labour market participation of foreigners in selected cities 2006 
 
City  Total 
employment 
Total share of  
foreign workers (%) 
Diversity index,  
foreign employees 
 (native  +  foreign)  all  high-skilled  All  high-skilled 
Hamburg 633,311  7.24  4.68  0.9160  0.9539 
Munich 563,931  14.53  7.63  0.8913  0.9328 
Frankfurt 396,702  13.85  7.00  0.9140  0.9545 
Cologne 369,060  10.21  5.15  0.8243  0.9493 
Hannover 335,503  6.24  4.15  0.8781  0.9529 
Duesseldorf 293,208  9.65  5.88  0.9137  0.9548 
Stuttgart 286,546  13.49  5.96  0.8685  0.9476 
          
Ø WESTERN 
GERMANY   6.56  4.21  0.8370  0.9032 
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